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1.	  Introduction	  
	  The	  Simulation	  Theory	  is	  an	  account	  of	  how	  we	  understand	  other	  people.	  In	  brief,	  the	  theory	  holds	  that	  we	  understand	  others	  by	  mentally	  simulating	  being	  them.	  Observing	  your	  behavior,	  I	  imagine	  what	  I	  would	  think,	  feel,	  and	  do	  in	  your	  situation.	  On	  the	  basis	  of	  this	  imaginative	  simulation,	  I	  make	  an	  inference	  about	  what	  you	  think,	  feel,	  and	  will	  do.	  	  	   Originally,	  the	  Simulation	  Theory	  was	  advanced	  as	  a	  theory	  of	  mindreading,	  i.e.,	  as	  a	  theory	  about	  how	  we	  attribute	  mental	  states	  to	  others	  in	  order	  to	  explain	  and	  predict	  their	  behavior	  (Goldman,	  2006b;	  Gordon,	  1986).	  The	  theory	  has	  been	  co-­‐opted	  to	  explain	  pretense	  (Currie	  &	  Ravenscroft,	  2002),	  engagement	  with	  fiction	  (Currie,	  2010;	  Goldman,	  2006a),	  imitation	  (Hurley,	  2005),	  and	  other	  cognitive	  feats	  (Davies	  &	  Stone,	  1995b).	  In	  each	  of	  these	  roles,	  simulation	  crucially	  involves	  imagination.	  In	  this	  chapter,	  I	  will	  focus	  on	  the	  Simulation	  Theory	  as	  a	  theory	  of	  mindreading.	  However,	  when	  appropriate,	  I	  will	  draw	  connections	  with	  these	  other	  uses	  of	  the	  theory.	  	  Mindreading	  consists	  in	  attributing	  a	  mental	  state	  to	  a	  target	  in	  order	  to	  understand	  the	  target’s	  behavior	  and	  anticipate	  future	  behavior.	  Mindreading	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theorists	  typically	  fall	  into	  two	  distinct	  camps:	  the	  Theory	  Theory	  (TT)	  and	  the	  Simulation	  Theory	  (ST).	  Theory	  theorists	  argue	  that	  we	  understand	  others	  by	  employing	  a	  folk	  psychological	  theory	  to	  explain	  and	  predict	  others’	  behaviors	  (Carruthers	  &	  Smith,	  1996;	  Davies	  &	  Stone,	  1995a).	  In	  contrast,	  simulation	  theorists	  argue	  that	  we	  do	  not	  need	  to	  employ	  a	  theory	  about	  folk	  psychology	  to	  understand	  others.	  The	  theory	  theorists	  over-­‐intellectualize	  this	  process.	  To	  understand	  a	  target’s	  behavior,	  all	  we	  need	  to	  do	  is	  imagine	  what	  we	  would	  think,	  feel,	  and	  do	  in	  the	  target’s	  situation,	  and	  on	  that	  basis	  we	  come	  to	  understand	  what	  the	  target	  thinks,	  feels,	  and	  will	  do	  (Davies	  &	  Stone,	  1995b).	  	  There	  are	  two	  kinds	  of	  simulational	  mindreading,	  which	  often	  work	  together.	  The	  first	  kind	  is	  retrodictive	  simulation.	  We	  simulate	  the	  target	  to	  figure	  out	  what	  the	  target’s	  mental	  states	  could	  have	  been	  to	  cause	  the	  observed	  behavior.	  That	  is,	  we	  imagine	  ourselves	  in	  the	  target’s	  situation	  and	  imagine	  what	  mental	  states	  could	  have	  caused	  us	  to	  act	  in	  the	  way	  the	  target	  acts.	  The	  result	  of	  the	  retrodictive	  simulation	  is	  an	  explanation	  of	  the	  target’s	  behavior.	  The	  second	  kind	  is	  projective	  simulation,	  which	  can	  take	  as	  input	  the	  output	  of	  the	  retrodictive	  simulation.	  We	  imagine	  that	  we	  have	  the	  target’s	  beliefs	  and	  desires,	  and	  we	  imagine	  what	  we	  would	  do	  next	  in	  that	  situation.	  We	  take	  the	  resulting	  conclusion	  and	  attribute	  it	  to	  the	  target.	  The	  result	  of	  the	  projective	  simulation	  is	  a	  prediction	  of	  what	  the	  target	  will	  do	  next.	  	  The	  ST	  sometimes	  is	  characterized	  as	  an	  information-­‐poor	  mindreading	  process.	  It	  does	  not	  require	  access	  to	  large	  bodies	  of	  information	  about	  folk	  psychology.	  We	  do	  not	  need	  theoretical	  knowledge	  about	  causal	  relations	  between	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mental	  states	  and	  behavior.	  Simulation	  requires	  the	  ability	  to	  imagine	  oneself	  in	  a	  target’s	  situation	  and	  figure	  out	  what	  one	  would	  feel,	  think,	  and	  do	  in	  that	  position.	  One	  simply	  redeploys	  one’s	  own	  cognitive	  mechanisms	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  mindreading.	  It	  is	  in	  this	  sense	  that	  the	  ST	  is	  an	  information-­‐poor	  mindreading	  process	  (Goldman,	  2006b).	  Simulational	  mindreading	  can	  be	  either	  “high-­‐level”	  or	  “low-­‐level.”	  For	  high-­‐level	  mindreading,	  the	  mental	  states	  involved	  are	  beliefs	  and	  other	  propositional	  attitudes,	  and	  the	  mindreading	  process	  is	  consciously	  and	  voluntarily	  mediated.	  For	  low-­‐level	  mindreading,	  the	  mental	  states	  involved	  are	  non-­‐propositional	  attitudes,	  such	  as	  emotions	  and	  basic	  intentions,	  and	  the	  mindreading	  process	  is	  largely	  automatic	  and	  non-­‐conscious.1	  	  	  In	  this	  chapter,	  I	  discuss	  three	  aspects	  of	  the	  ST:	  the	  concept	  of	  simulation,	  high-­‐level	  simulation,	  and	  low-­‐level	  simulation.	  In	  the	  next	  section,	  I	  argue	  for	  a	  more	  precise	  characterization	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  simulation.	  In	  sections	  3	  and	  4,	  I	  discuss	  high-­‐level	  simulation	  and	  low-­‐level	  simulations,	  which	  are	  quite	  different	  in	  some	  respects.	  High-­‐level	  simulation	  involves	  imagination	  in	  the	  conventional	  sense.	  The	  process	  and	  product	  of	  high-­‐level	  simulation	  are	  consciously	  accessible	  and	  potentially	  under	  the	  control	  of	  the	  agent.	  In	  contrast,	  low-­‐level	  simulation	  involves	  an	  unconventional	  sense	  of	  imagination,	  and	  the	  process	  and	  product	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The distinction between low-level and high-level simulation need not take a stand on 
propositionalism, the view that all attitudes are propositional. If your view is that that all 
attitudes are propositional attitudes, then on your view low-level simulation involves 
propositional attitudes. Throughout the paper I will assume that there are non-
propositional attitudes, but my arguments do not hang on this assumption.  
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low-­‐level	  simulation	  are	  involuntary	  and	  not	  consciously	  accessible.	  I	  discuss	  the	  features	  and	  potential	  limitations	  of	  both	  high-­‐level	  and	  low-­‐level	  simulation.	  	  
2.	  The	  Concept	  of	  Simulation	  	  One	  difficulty	  in	  assessing	  the	  ST	  is	  that	  the	  concept	  of	  simulation	  often	  is	  not	  well	  defined.	  There	  is	  no	  unified	  conception	  of	  simulation	  across	  the	  sciences.	  Computer	  simulations,	  physical	  simulations,	  abstract	  simulations	  in	  scientific	  modeling,	  and	  mental	  simulations	  have	  little	  in	  common.	  There	  is	  no	  consensus	  on	  what	  exactly	  simulation	  is	  even	  in	  the	  cognitive	  sciences,	  not	  even	  in	  the	  area	  of	  mindreading.	  As	  a	  result,	  some	  theorists	  have	  called	  for	  a	  moratorium	  on	  the	  term	  (Nichols	  &	  Stich,	  2003,	  p.	  134).	  Within	  the	  field	  of	  mindreading,	  Alvin	  Goldman	  has	  done	  the	  most	  to	  advance	  the	  concept	  of	  simulation.	  My	  exploration	  of	  the	  ST	  will	  be	  based	  on	  Goldman’s	  influential	  work.	  Goldman	  defines	  simulation	  in	  the	  following	  way:	  Process	  P	  simulates	  process	  P´	  iff	  (1)	  P	  duplicates,	  replicates	  or	  resembles	  P´	  in	  some	  significant	  respect	  and	  (2)	  in	  its	  duplication	  of	  P´,	  P	  fulfills	  one	  of	  its	  purposes	  or	  functions.	  	  For	  mindreading	  simulation,	  P	  and	  P´	  are	  mental	  processes	  and	  the	  purpose	  or	  function	  of	  P	  –	  the	  simulating	  process	  –	  is	  to	  understand	  a	  target’s	  mental	  states	  (Goldman,	  2006b).	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This	  definition	  of	  simulation	  is	  vague.2	  With	  respect	  to	  (1),	  it	  is	  unclear	  what	  is	  it	  for	  a	  process	  to	  duplicate,	  replicate	  or	  resemble	  another	  process	  in	  some	  
significant	  respect.	  Following	  Justin	  Fisher	  (2006),	  let	  us	  distinguish	  concrete	  and	  
abstract	  replications.	  When	  event	  A	  concretely	  replicates	  event	  B,	  A	  and	  B	  involve	  the	  same	  types	  of	  systems	  and	  exhibit	  similar	  fine-­‐grained	  details.	  Building	  a	  functional	  model	  rocket	  is	  an	  example	  of	  concrete	  replication.	  The	  model	  rocket	  reproduces	  the	  parts	  of	  the	  rocket	  and	  the	  relations	  among	  those	  parts	  and	  the	  environment.	  An	  accurate	  model	  rocket	  will	  replicate,	  in	  proportion,	  the	  concrete	  details	  of	  the	  actual	  rocket.	  When	  using	  a	  model	  rocket	  to	  explain	  or	  predict	  the	  behavior	  of	  an	  actual	  rocket,	  the	  success	  of	  the	  replication	  depends	  on	  reproducing	  the	  fine-­‐grained	  details	  of	  the	  actual	  rocket	  and	  its	  environment.	  	  In	  contrast,	  when	  event	  A	  abstractly	  replicates	  event	  B,	  A	  and	  B	  need	  not	  involve	  the	  same	  types	  of	  systems	  or	  fine-­‐grained	  details.	  For	  example,	  the	  mathematical	  process	  in	  my	  head	  when	  I	  add	  2	  and	  3	  abstractly	  resembles	  a	  calculator’s	  mathematical	  process	  of	  adding	  2	  and	  3.	  Both	  the	  system	  underlying	  the	  calculator’s	  mathematical	  process	  and	  the	  fine-­‐grained	  details	  of	  the	  process	  differ	  from	  the	  cognitive	  system	  underlying,	  and	  the	  fine-­‐grained	  details	  of,	  my	  mathematical	  process.	  	  The	  central	  difference	  between	  abstract	  and	  concrete	  replication	  is	  that	  successful	  abstract	  replication	  does	  not	  require	  sameness	  of	  system	  and	  fine-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 This discussion of the concept of simulation is based on previous work. See Spaulding 
(2012) for a more in depth discussion. 
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grained	  process	  similarity,	  whereas	  successful	  concrete	  replication	  does.3	  The	  calculator	  may	  successfully	  replicate	  my	  mathematical	  process	  –	  that	  is,	  it	  may	  perform	  a	  mathematical	  process	  the	  output	  of	  which	  is	  the	  same	  as	  the	  output	  of	  the	  mathematical	  process	  that	  occurs	  in	  me	  –	  without	  matching	  the	  fine-­‐grained	  details	  of	  my	  cognitive	  process.	  Crucially,	  when	  A	  abstractly	  replicates	  B,	  A	  and	  B	  may	  in	  fact	  be	  the	  same	  type	  of	  process	  and	  share	  the	  same	  fine-­‐grained	  details,	  but	  the	  success	  of	  the	  replication	  –	  equifinality	  –	  does	  not	  depend	  on	  this	  similarity.	  This	  point	  will	  be	  important	  later.	  I	  suggest	  that	  when	  Goldman	  claims	  that	  simulation	  requires	  that	  process	  P	  replicates,	  duplicates	  or	  resembles	  process	  P´	  in	  some	  significant	  respect,	  this	  ought	  to	  mean	  that	  P	  concretely	  replicates	  P´.	  Abstract	  replications	  do	  not	  count	  as	  significant	  replications	  because	  they	  are	  ubiquitous.	  Using	  a	  calculator,	  an	  abacus,	  a	  look-­‐up	  table,	  counting	  on	  one’s	  fingers,	  and	  the	  operations	  of	  a	  particular	  Turing	  machine	  are	  all	  abstract	  replications	  of	  the	  mathematical	  process	  that	  occurs	  in	  my	  mind	  when	  I	  add	  2	  and	  3.	  At	  a	  coarse-­‐grained	  level	  they	  resemble	  the	  mathematical	  process	  that	  occurs	  in	  my	  brain	  when	  I	  add	  2	  and	  3.	  In	  contrast,	  concrete	  replications	  generally	  are	  far	  less	  common	  than	  abstract	  replications	  (because	  the	  criteria	  for	  concrete	  replications	  are	  more	  stringent),	  and	  the	  replicational	  aspect	  plays	  a	  central	  role	  in	  their	  success.	  If	  the	  ST	  is	  to	  offer	  an	  interesting,	  distinctive	  claim	  about	  how	  mindreading	  operates,	  it	  ought	  to	  be	  restricted	  to	  concrete	  replications.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 What counts as a successful replication depends on the particular replication at hand. 
For the mathematical process, it is coming up with the same result. For the rocket, it is 
duplicating the conditions of the actual rocket. 
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Another	  reason	  that	  simulation	  should	  require	  concrete	  replication	  is	  that	  some	  versions	  of	  the	  TT	  entail	  abstract	  replication	  (Fisher,	  2006,	  p.	  422).	  For	  example,	  in	  predicting	  whether	  you	  will	  decide	  to	  go	  to	  the	  party	  on	  Friday	  night,	  I	  call	  on	  my	  knowledge	  that	  you	  enjoy	  parties,	  you	  like	  the	  people	  who	  are	  attending	  the	  party,	  you	  have	  had	  a	  difficult	  week	  and	  desire	  to	  go	  out,	  and	  you	  know	  that	  you	  have	  been	  invited	  to	  a	  party	  on	  Friday	  night.	  I	  theorize	  that	  you	  believe	  there	  is	  a	  party	  on	  Friday	  night	  and	  desire	  to	  go	  to	  the	  party,	  and	  that	  you	  do	  not	  have	  a	  competing	  desire	  not	  to	  attend	  the	  party.	  Thus,	  I	  predict	  that	  you	  will	  go	  to	  the	  party.	  Suppose	  that	  my	  reasoning	  process	  just	  so	  happens	  to	  resemble	  your	  reasoning	  process.	  We	  both	  weigh	  various	  considerations,	  decide	  how	  to	  maximize	  preferences,	  etc.	  Despite	  the	  fact	  that	  I	  am	  theorizing	  about	  your	  behavior,	  my	  cognitive	  system	  merely	  abstractly	  replicates	  your	  decision-­‐making	  process.	  My	  reasoning	  process	  only	  accidentally	  resembled	  your	  reasoning	  process.4	  You	  may	  have	  employed	  a	  very	  different	  sort	  of	  reasoning	  to	  get	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  you	  will	  go	  to	  the	  party.	  The	  success	  of	  my	  prediction	  does	  not	  depend	  on	  a	  fine-­‐grained	  similarity	  between	  my	  cognitive	  process	  and	  yours.	  Thus,	  the	  TT	  entails	  abstract	  replications.	  	  Given	  that	  abstract	  replications	  are	  so	  easy	  to	  come	  by,	  and	  that	  the	  TT	  entails	  them,	  the	  ST	  needs	  a	  more	  restrictive	  account	  of	  simulation.	  The	  ST	  needs	  to	  be	  restricted	  to	  concrete	  replications,	  which	  are	  not	  ubiquitous	  and	  not	  entailed	  by	  the	  TT.	  This	  means	  that	  simulation	  theorists	  must	  show	  that	  their	  examples	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 It would count as abstract replication even if the resemblance were non-accidental. I 
emphasize accidental resemblance in the main text to highlight the fact that the success of 
an abstract replication does not depend on any fine-grained similarities between the 
processes. This is further evidence that abstract replication is too liberal for ST.  
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simulational	  mindreading	  are	  cases	  in	  which	  the	  mindreader’s	  mental	  process	  replicates	  the	  actual	  mental	  process	  the	  target	  goes	  through,	  and	  that	  the	  non-­‐accidental	  success	  of	  the	  simulation	  depends	  on	  replicating	  that	  mental	  process.	  This	  is	  not	  an	  overly	  burdensome	  requirement,	  but	  it	  will	  limit	  what	  counts	  as	  simulational	  mindreading	  (Fisher,	  2006).	  	  Goldman’s	  second	  criterion	  for	  a	  process	  P	  to	  simulate	  P´	  is	  that	  in	  its	  duplication	  of	  P´,	  P	  fulfills	  one	  of	  the	  purposes	  or	  functions	  of	  P.	  How	  can	  we	  tell	  when	  a	  process	  has	  the	  function	  of	  (concretely)	  replicating	  another	  process?	  Simulation	  theorists	  do	  not	  provide	  many	  details,	  but	  they	  give	  examples	  of	  what	  they	  take	  to	  be	  simulational	  processes.	  These	  examples	  include	  using	  one’s	  own	  inference	  mechanisms	  to	  determine	  what	  a	  target	  believes	  (Nichols	  &	  Stich,	  2003,	  p.	  135),	  using	  one’s	  own	  inference	  mechanism	  to	  predict	  the	  kind	  of	  inferences	  others	  will	  make	  (Stich	  &	  Nichols,	  1995);	  using	  one’s	  own	  grammaticality	  system	  to	  determine	  whether	  a	  target	  will	  judge	  a	  particular	  sentence	  to	  be	  grammatical	  (Harris,	  1995);	  using	  our	  knowledge	  of	  a	  scientific	  theory	  to	  predict	  what	  other	  experts	  in	  the	  field	  believe	  (Heal,	  1995);	  using	  our	  arithmetical	  skills	  to	  figure	  out	  how	  a	  target	  will	  answer	  an	  arithmetic	  question	  (Heal,	  2003).	  	  	  	  	  The	  problem	  with	  these	  examples	  is	  that	  they	  do	  not	  discriminate	  cases	  in	  which	  a	  process	  happens	  to	  replicate	  another	  process	  from	  cases	  in	  which	  replication	  is	  the	  function	  of	  the	  process.	  Consider	  the	  following	  case,	  which	  shares	  the	  same	  form	  as	  the	  other	  examples	  but	  is	  not	  a	  case	  of	  simulational	  mindreading	  (Ramsey,	  2010).	  In	  watching	  a	  baseball	  game,	  I	  predict	  that	  the	  pitcher	  will	  throw	  to	  first	  base.	  I	  see	  that	  the	  runner	  has	  strayed	  too	  far	  off	  base,	  I	  see	  that	  the	  pitcher	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sees	  this,	  and	  I	  infer	  that	  since	  the	  pitcher	  sees	  that	  the	  runner	  has	  strayed	  too	  far	  off	  base	  that	  he	  believes	  this.	  This	  belief,	  plus	  the	  attributed	  belief	  that	  runners	  who	  stray	  too	  far	  off	  base	  are	  easy	  to	  throw	  out,	  and	  the	  attributed	  desire	  to	  throw	  out	  runners,	  lead	  me	  to	  predict	  that	  the	  pitcher	  will	  throw	  to	  first	  base.	  I	  theorize	  about	  what	  the	  pitcher	  will	  do	  and	  why.	  When	  I	  see	  what	  the	  pitcher	  sees,	  I	  reason	  as	  the	  pitcher	  reasons.	  My	  perceptual	  system	  generates	  a	  belief	  about	  the	  status	  of	  the	  runner,	  as	  does	  the	  pitcher’s	  perceptual	  system.	  But	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  I	  am	  simulating	  the	  pitcher’s	  visual	  system	  and	  decision-­‐making	  processes.	  In	  this	  case	  I	  am	  using	  my	  visual	  system	  in	  the	  way	  that	  it	  is	  normally	  used;	  to	  ascertain	  various	  facts	  about	  the	  world	  that	  I	  can	  use	  in	  my	  reasoning.	  I	  employ	  these	  facts	  in	  reasoning	  about	  where	  the	  pitcher	  ought	  to	  throw.	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  states	  of	  my	  perceptual	  system	  and	  reasoning	  process	  about	  where	  the	  ball	  needs	  to	  be	  thrown	  resemble	  the	  processes	  taking	  place	  in	  the	  pitcher’s	  mind	  does	  not	  entail	  that	  I	  am	  simulating	  the	  pitcher.	  I	  am	  simply	  using	  my	  cognitive	  capacities	  as	  I	  normally	  do,	  i.e.,	  as	  a	  fact	  finder,	  and	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  facts	  I	  know	  about	  the	  world	  and	  the	  pitcher,	  I	  predict	  that	  the	  pitcher	  will	  throw	  to	  first	  base	  (Ramsey,	  2010).	  We	  must	  distinguish	  when	  our	  cognitive	  mechanisms	  are	  being	  used	  as	  they	  normally	  are	  –	  as	  fact	  finders	  that	  merely	  happen	  to	  replicate	  the	  cognitive	  processes	  in	  a	  target	  –	  from	  when	  they	  are	  being	  used	  to	  simulate	  a	  target’s	  cognitive	  processes.	  In	  other	  words,	  we	  need	  a	  way	  to	  determine	  when	  a	  process	  has	  the	  function	  of	  concretely	  replicating	  another	  process.	  In	  order	  to	  determine	  this,	  we	  need	  to	  look	  at	  two	  features	  of	  the	  cognitive	  process	  in	  question:	  how	  it	  operates	  and	  its	  content	  (Nichols	  &	  Stich,	  2003,	  pp.	  132-­‐135;	  Ramsey,	  2010).	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Genuine	  mental	  simulation	  requires	  that	  the	  cognitive	  process	  be	  taken	  “offline”	  and	  provided	  with	  non-­‐standard	  inputs.5	  The	  first	  criterion	  for	  a	  process	  P	  to	  have	  the	  function	  of	  replicating	  P`	  is	  that	  P	  is	  taken	  “offline”	  in	  its	  simulating	  role.	  When	  I	  am	  genuinely	  simulating	  a	  target’s	  cognitive	  processes,	  I	  use	  my	  own	  cognitive	  mechanisms	  but	  the	  process	  does	  not	  result	  in	  an	  action,	  decision,	  etc.,	  as	  it	  does	  when	  I	  am	  using	  my	  cognitive	  mechanisms	  “online.”	  Rather,	  it	  is	  merely	  an	  imagined	  action,	  decision,	  etc.	  Importantly,	  this	  criterion	  is	  neutral	  with	  respect	  to	  whether	  P	  in	  its	  offline	  role	  is	  conscious	  and	  voluntary	  or	  unconscious	  and	  involuntary.	  The	  second	  criterion	  is	  that	  the	  content	  (i.e.,	  the	  input	  and	  output)	  of	  my	  simulational	  cognitive	  process	  is	  (or	  aims	  to	  be)	  the	  content	  of	  the	  target’s	  cognitive	  process.	  In	  other	  words,	  inputs	  and	  outputs	  of	  the	  simulational	  process	  are	  non-­‐standard;	  they	  are	  imaginative	  representational	  surrogates	  for	  the	  target’s	  mental	  states.	  This	  criterion	  is	  neutral	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  kind	  of	  representational	  surrogates	  involved.	  These	  may	  be	  propositional	  attitudes	  or	  non-­‐propositional	  mental	  states	  like	  emotions	  or	  images.	  	  These	  two	  criteria	  for	  figuring	  out	  whether	  P	  has	  the	  function	  of	  simulating	  P`	  –	  offline	  operation	  and	  representational	  surrogates	  –	  allow	  for	  processes	  that	  are	  conscious,	  voluntary,	  and	  involve	  propositional	  attitudes	  and	  processes	  that	  are	  unconscious,	  non-­‐voluntary,	  and	  involve	  non-­‐propositional	  attitudes.	  This	  means	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Though these criteria are standard for ST, Goldman has argued that they are required 
only for high-level simulation (Goldman, 2006b, p. 131). I consider this argument in 
section 4 below.  
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that	  these	  requirements	  for	  simulation	  apply	  both	  to	  low-­‐level	  and	  high-­‐level	  mindreading.	  Putting	  this	  all	  together,	  we	  have	  the	  following	  definition	  of	  simulation:	  1. P	  concretely	  resembles	  P´,	  which	  requires	  that:	  a. P	  and	  P´	  involve	  the	  same	  type	  of	  system;	  b. P	  and	  P´	  exhibit	  similar	  fine-­‐grained	  details.	  2. In	  resembling	  P´,	  P	  fulfills	  one	  of	  its	  functions,	  which	  requires	  that:	  a. The	  success	  of	  the	  simulation	  depends	  on	  P	  concretely	  resembling	  P´;	  b. P	  is	  taken	  “offline”	  in	  its	  simulating	  role;	  c. The	  input	  and	  output	  of	  P	  are	  representational	  surrogates	  for	  the	  input	  and	  output	  of	  P´.	  Consider	  again	  some	  of	  the	  examples	  discussed	  so	  far.	  On	  this	  definition,	  the	  way	  in	  which	  I	  determined	  that	  you	  would	  attend	  the	  party	  Friday	  night	  –	  theorizing	  about	  what	  you	  would	  do	  in	  a	  way	  that	  just	  so	  happened	  to	  resemble	  your	  own	  reasoning	  process	  –	  does	  not	  count	  as	  a	  simulation	  because	  it	  does	  not	  meet	  2a,	  2b,	  or	  2c.	  My	  prediction	  that	  the	  pitcher	  will	  throw	  to	  first	  base	  is	  not	  the	  result	  of	  a	  simulation	  because	  it	  does	  not	  meet	  2a,	  2b,	  or	  2c,	  either.	  A	  legitimate	  case	  of	  simulation	  is	  one	  where	  I	  use	  my	  cognitive	  system	  to	  concretely	  replicate	  your	  mental	  process,	  i.e.,	  I	  adopt	  representational	  surrogates	  for	  your	  mental	  states	  and	  run	  them	  through	  my	  own	  offline	  cognitive	  mechanisms,	  and	  the	  success	  of	  this	  process	  depends	  on	  replicating	  the	  mental	  process	  that	  you	  actually	  go	  through.	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We	  ought	  to	  adopt	  this	  more	  precise	  conception	  of	  simulation.	  Though	  it	  is	  more	  demanding	  than	  Goldman’s	  generic	  conception	  discussed	  above,	  the	  problem	  with	  the	  generic	  conception	  is	  that	  it	  is	  far	  too	  lax.	  This	  more	  precise	  account	  of	  simulation	  rules	  out	  those	  illegitimate	  examples	  of	  simulation	  and	  captures	  what	  is	  truly	  distinctive	  about	  legitimate	  cases	  of	  simulation.	  Moreover,	  it	  offers	  a	  unified	  conception	  of	  simulation	  that	  is	  appropriate	  both	  for	  high-­‐level	  and	  low-­‐level	  simulation.	  	  
3.	  High-­‐Level	  Simulation	  
	  Now	  that	  we	  have	  clarified	  the	  concept	  of	  simulation,	  we	  can	  discuss	  high-­‐level	  and	  low-­‐level	  simulation.	  Before	  philosophers	  and	  cognitive	  scientists	  conceived	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  low-­‐level	  mental	  simulation,	  all	  simulational	  mindreading	  was	  considered	  high-­‐level,	  i.e.,	  consciously	  accessible	  and	  voluntarily	  mediated.	  In	  this	  section,	  I	  describe	  exactly	  how	  high-­‐level	  simulation	  mindreading	  is	  meant	  to	  work	  and	  identify	  some	  theoretical	  worries	  about	  it.	  Recall	  the	  two	  kinds	  of	  simulational	  mindreading.	  First	  the	  subject	  retrodictively	  simulates	  the	  target	  in	  order	  to	  figure	  out	  what	  mental	  states	  could	  have	  caused	  that	  behavior,	  and	  then	  the	  subject	  projectively	  simulates	  in	  order	  to	  figure	  what	  the	  target	  will	  do	  next.	  Suppose	  I	  have	  a	  guest	  lecturer	  in	  my	  class	  one	  day	  and	  a	  student	  comes	  in	  late.	  She	  slowly	  opens	  the	  door,	  looks	  to	  the	  front	  of	  the	  room,	  and	  leaves.	  According	  to	  the	  ST,	  first	  I	  imagine	  myself	  in	  the	  student’s	  situation.	  I	  imagine	  that	  I	  am	  coming	  in	  late	  to	  class,	  I	  see	  a	  stranger	  at	  the	  front	  of	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the	  room,	  and	  I	  walk	  out.	  I	  imagine	  what	  I	  would	  think	  in	  this	  situation.	  Perhaps	  I	  would	  think	  that	  in	  my	  rush	  to	  get	  to	  class,	  I	  walked	  into	  the	  wrong	  classroom.	  Or	  maybe	  I	  would	  think	  a	  guest	  lecturer	  is	  not	  worth	  my	  time,	  so	  I	  leave.	  Or	  perhaps	  I	  know	  and	  dislike	  the	  guest	  lecturer,	  so	  I	  prefer	  not	  listen	  to	  him.	  I	  imaginatively	  adopt	  these	  mental	  states	  to	  see	  if	  they	  would	  explain	  the	  observed	  behavior.	  I	  determine	  that	  if	  I	  were	  in	  that	  situation,	  I	  would	  think	  that	  I	  walked	  into	  the	  wrong	  class.	  Thus,	  I	  attribute	  to	  the	  student	  the	  desire	  to	  attend	  my	  class	  and	  the	  false	  belief	  that	  she	  has	  walked	  into	  the	  wrong	  classroom.	  For	  the	  projective	  simulation,	  the	  subject	  takes	  the	  results	  of	  the	  retrodictive	  simulation	  and	  imagines	  what	  she	  would	  do	  next	  if	  she	  were	  in	  the	  target’s	  situation.	  In	  our	  example,	  I	  imaginatively	  adopt	  the	  desire	  to	  attend	  class	  and	  the	  belief	  that	  I	  have	  walked	  into	  the	  wrong	  classroom,	  and	  I	  run	  this	  information	  through	  my	  own	  decision-­‐making	  mechanisms.	  I	  imaginatively	  decide	  to	  check	  the	  classroom	  location	  on	  the	  syllabus,	  which	  as	  a	  good	  student	  I	  always	  carry	  with	  me.	  I	  imagine	  that	  having	  done	  this,	  I	  would	  realize	  that	  I	  did	  not	  walk	  into	  the	  wrong	  classroom.	  I	  imaginatively	  decide	  to	  peek	  into	  the	  classroom	  again	  to	  see	  if	  I	  recognize	  the	  other	  students	  in	  the	  room.	  I	  imagine	  that	  doing	  this	  would	  result	  in	  the	  realization	  that	  all	  of	  my	  classmates	  are	  in	  the	  room,	  and	  that	  the	  person	  at	  the	  front	  of	  the	  room	  is	  just	  a	  guest	  lecturer,	  and	  as	  a	  result	  I	  would	  come	  back	  into	  the	  classroom.	  Thus,	  through	  this	  simulational	  process,	  I	  generate	  a	  prediction	  about	  what	  the	  student	  will	  do.	  I	  predict	  that	  she	  will	  check	  her	  syllabus,	  realize	  that	  she	  did	  not	  make	  a	  mistake,	  and	  then	  come	  back	  into	  the	  classroom.	  	  
	   14	  
This	  example	  highlights	  several	  facts	  about	  high-­‐level	  simulational	  mindreading.	  First,	  high-­‐level	  simulation	  involves	  imagination	  in	  the	  conventional	  sense.	  In	  both	  the	  retrodictive	  and	  projective	  simulation,	  I	  consciously	  and	  deliberatively	  imagine	  myself	  in	  the	  target’s	  circumstances.	  Second,	  high-­‐level	  simulation	  easily	  can	  be	  co-­‐opted	  to	  explain	  our	  engagement	  with	  fiction	  (Currie	  &	  Ravenscroft,	  2002;	  Doggett	  &	  Egan,	  2012).	  I	  simply	  put	  myself	  in	  the	  fictional	  character’s	  position	  and	  imagine	  what	  I	  would	  think,	  feel,	  and	  do	  in	  that	  situation.	  I	  imaginatively	  adopt	  the	  beliefs	  and	  desires	  of	  the	  character	  and	  in	  some	  circumstances	  even	  have	  affective	  responses	  to	  the	  fictional	  events.	  When	  Othello	  approaches	  Desdemona	  in	  a	  murderous	  rage,	  I	  feel	  something	  like	  fear	  horror	  at	  this	  impending	  fictional	  murder.6	  Third,	  this	  account	  of	  simulational	  mindreading	  could	  be	  co-­‐opted	  to	  explain	  how	  some	  thought	  experiments	  work	  (Williamson,	  2015).	  In	  some	  thought	  experiments,	  you	  imagine	  being	  in	  a	  particular	  situation	  and	  then	  you	  entertain	  a	  question	  about	  what	  you	  would	  think	  or	  do	  in	  that	  situation.	  In	  this	  way,	  potentially	  you	  could	  get	  knowledge	  through	  simulational	  imagination.7	  One	  worry	  about	  the	  ST	  is	  about	  whether	  it	  is	  computationally	  tractable.	  For	  ST,	  explanation	  requires	  identifying	  what	  the	  possible	  relevant	  mental	  states	  of	  the	  target	  could	  have	  been	  in	  order	  to	  cause	  the	  observed	  behavior,	  running	  the	  imagined	  mental	  states	  through	  one’s	  own	  (offline)	  decision-­‐making	  mechanism	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 The characterization of these affective responses is a matter of much dispute. Some 
argue that the affective responses simply are emotions (Carroll, 1990; Gendler, 2008; 
Weinberg & Meskin, 2006), where as others argue that they are best characterized as 
imaginative emotions (Goldman, 2006a; Velleman, 2000; Walton, 1990). Simulation 
theorists tend to fall in the latter category, but we need not take a stance on that issue 
here. 
7 See Spaulding (2015) for a discussion of how exactly we can and do get knowledge 
through imagination.  
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and,	  once	  plausible	  candidate	  mental	  states	  are	  identified,	  attributing	  the	  computed	  imagined	  decision	  to	  the	  target	  as	  an	  explanation	  of	  past	  behavior	  and	  prediction	  for	  future	  behavior.	  For	  social	  interactions	  that	  involve	  a	  range	  of	  people	  and	  behaviors,	  one	  would	  first	  need	  to	  identify	  the	  possible	  relevant	  mental	  states	  of	  all	  the	  participants	  and	  run	  the	  simulations	  simultaneously	  to	  come	  up	  with	  a	  coherent	  explanation	  of	  the	  participants’	  behaviors	  and	  then	  use	  this	  explanation	  to	  imaginatively	  simulate	  the	  decisions	  of	  the	  participants.	  It	  is	  an	  open	  question	  whether	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  run	  multiple	  simultaneous	  simulations	  through	  one’s	  own	  decision-­‐making	  mechanism.	  However	  the	  more	  serious	  problem	  is	  that	  the	  targets’	  behavior	  and	  mental	  states	  will	  be	  interdependent.	  ST’s	  simultaneous,	  interdependent	  simulations,	  if	  they	  are	  even	  possible,	  would	  be	  computationally	  intractable	  (Bermúdez,	  2003a,	  pp.	  31-­‐34).	  Another	  theoretical	  limitation	  of	  the	  ST	  is	  what	  is	  known	  as	  the	  “threat	  of	  collapse”	  (Davies	  &	  Stone,	  1995b).	  To	  retrodictively	  simulate	  my	  student,	  I	  observe	  her	  walking	  out	  of	  class	  upon	  seeing	  the	  guest	  speaker,	  imagine	  myself	  her	  situation,	  generate	  hypothetical	  beliefs	  and	  desires	  that	  would	  explain	  why	  I	  would	  walk	  out	  of	  class	  if	  I	  were	  in	  that	  situation,	  and	  then	  attribute	  those	  mental	  states	  to	  my	  student.	  The	  difficulty	  here	  is	  that	  there	  are	  indefinitely	  many	  mental	  state	  combinations	  that	  would	  explain	  the	  observed	  behavior.	  If	  we	  were	  to	  try	  to	  figure	  out,	  with	  simulation	  resources	  only,	  what	  our	  mental	  states	  could	  have	  been	  to	  cause	  us	  to	  behave	  like	  the	  target,	  our	  retrodictive	  simulation	  would	  have	  no	  way	  to	  decide	  between	  radically	  different	  belief-­‐desire	  combinations	  that	  would	  explain	  the	  behavior.	  Moreover,	  there	  would	  be	  no	  stopping	  point	  for	  the	  retrodictive	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simulation.	  The	  simulation	  itself	  provides	  no	  way	  to	  determine	  when	  we	  have	  landed	  on	  a	  good-­‐enough	  explanation	  of	  the	  observed	  behavior	  and	  can	  stop	  simulating.	  	  This	  problem	  is	  called	  the	  threat	  of	  collapse	  because,	  upon	  inspection	  of	  imagination-­‐based	  simulation,	  it	  is	  evident	  that	  the	  ST	  needs	  the	  theoretical	  knowledge	  posited	  by	  the	  TT.	  Thus,	  it	  is	  argued,	  perhaps	  hyperbolically,	  that	  the	  ST	  simply	  collapses	  into	  the	  TT.	  Retrodictive	  simulation	  reveals	  some	  of	  the	  possible	  mental	  states	  that	  a	  target	  may	  have,	  but	  it	  cannot,	  all	  by	  itself,	  provide	  knowledge	  of	  other	  minds.	  Theoretical	  information	  is	  required	  to	  move	  from	  identifying	  possible	  mental	  states	  to	  knowing	  a	  target’s	  mental	  states.	  Most	  simulation	  theorists	  these	  days	  recognize	  this	  problem	  and	  as	  a	  result	  endorse	  hybrid	  ST/TT	  models	  (Davies	  &	  Stone,	  1995b;	  Goldman,	  2006b;	  Heal,	  1998;	  Nichols	  &	  Stich,	  2003).	  The	  hybrid	  models	  handle	  the	  threat	  of	  collapse,	  and	  they	  may	  also	  alleviate	  the	  computational	  worries	  about	  running	  multiple,	  interdependent	  simulations.	  
	  
4.	  Low-­‐Level	  Simulation	  	  Like	  high-­‐level	  simulation,	  low-­‐level	  simulational	  mindreading	  involves	  both	  retrodictive	  and	  projective	  simulation.	  One	  central	  difference	  between	  high-­‐level	  and	  low-­‐level	  simulation	  is	  that	  one	  has	  neither	  conscious	  access	  to	  nor	  control	  over	  the	  process	  or	  product	  of	  low-­‐level	  simulational	  mindreading.	  Low-­‐level	  simulation	  involves	  an	  unconventional	  conception	  of	  imagination.	  In	  the	  context	  of	  low-­‐level	  simulation,	  imagination	  operates	  unconsciously	  and	  automatically.	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The	  ordinary,	  folk	  conception	  of	  imagination	  is	  that	  it	  is	  conscious	  and	  potentially	  under	  the	  agent’s	  voluntary	  control.	  However,	  several	  theorists	  have	  argued	  that	  imagination	  may	  be	  non-­‐conscious	  and	  non-­‐voluntary	  (Church,	  2008;	  Goldman,	  2006b;	  Nanay,	  2013;	  Van	  Leeuwen,	  2014;	  Walton,	  1990).	  Kendall	  Walton,	  for	  example,	  posits	  non-­‐occurrent	  imaginings	  that	  do	  not	  occupy	  the	  subject’s	  attention.	  Bence	  Nanay’s	  conception	  of	  pragmatic	  mental	  imagery	  involves	  spatially	  rich	  representations	  that	  may	  or	  may	  not	  involve	  conscious	  visualization.	  Jennifer	  Church	  argues	  that	  several	  ordinary	  cases	  of	  imagining	  are	  most	  plausibly	  explained	  by	  unconscious	  imagining.	  She	  considers	  several	  objections	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  imagination	  can	  be	  non-­‐conscious	  and	  develops	  her	  own	  account	  of	  unconscious	  imagining.	  In	  each	  of	  these	  cases,	  imagination	  involves	  imagery,	  but	  this	  imagery	  may	  not	  be	  conscious	  and	  it	  need	  not	  be	  under	  the	  voluntary	  control	  of	  the	  subject.	  Although	  the	  notion	  of	  unconscious	  imagining	  is	  unconventional,	  it	  is	  not	  unprecedented.	  Several	  prominent	  figures	  in	  the	  philosophy	  of	  imagination	  argue	  for	  it.	  Thus,	  it	  is	  appropriate	  to	  hold	  that	  low-­‐level	  simulation	  involves	  imagination.	  	  I	  argued	  above	  that	  high-­‐level	  and	  low-­‐level	  simulation	  have	  the	  same	  basic	  requirements.	  It	  is	  worth	  pausing	  to	  consider	  an	  objection	  to	  my	  claim	  that	  the	  above	  requirements	  apply	  to	  high-­‐level	  and	  low-­‐level	  simulation.	  Goldman	  argues	  that	  2b	  (offline	  operation)	  and	  2c	  (representational	  surrogates)	  are	  required	  only	  for	  high-­‐level	  simulational	  mindreading.	  These	  two	  criteria	  require	  using	  pretense	  or	  imagination,	  which	  Goldman	  argues	  are	  high-­‐level	  activities	  that	  are	  potentially	  and	  intermittently	  under	  intentional	  guidance	  or	  control.	  Low-­‐level	  simulational	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mindreading	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	  fully	  automatic,	  though	  (Goldman,	  2006b,	  pp.	  131-­‐132).	  	   The	  definition	  of	  simulation	  I	  offer	  can	  accommodate	  Goldman’s	  claims	  about	  low-­‐level	  mindreading.	  Imagination	  is	  required	  to	  produce	  representational	  surrogates	  for	  the	  low-­‐level	  simulation,	  but	  above	  I	  cite	  several	  prominent	  theorists	  who	  allow	  for	  unconscious,	  involuntary	  imagination.	  Even	  by	  Goldman’s	  own	  lights,	  imagination	  need	  not	  be	  a	  conscious,	  voluntary	  process.	  In	  characterizing	  E-­‐
imagination	  (his	  prototype	  for	  high-­‐level	  simulational	  mindreading),	  Goldman	  cautions	  against	  adopting	  the	  naïve	  conception	  of	  imagination,	  which	  is	  restricted	  to	  the	  sphere	  of	  consciousness	  and	  the	  control	  of	  the	  will.	  “E-­‐imagination	  is	  introduced	  here	  as	  a	  psychological	  construct,	  the	  referents	  of	  which	  can	  either	  be	  conscious	  or	  covert,	  voluntary	  or	  automatic,	  and	  these	  properties	  can	  hold	  for	  both	  the	  generating	  process	  and	  the	  products	  so	  generated”	  (Goldman,	  2006b,	  p.	  151).	  We	  can	  say	  that	  low-­‐level	  simulation	  involves	  psychological	  surrogates	  (non-­‐consciously	  and	  automatically	  produced	  by	  imagination)	  that	  are	  run	  through	  one’s	  offline	  cognitive	  mechanisms.	  Thus,	  these	  criteria	  for	  simulation	  can	  be	  applied	  to	  low-­‐level	  simulation,	  as	  well.	  	  Moreover,	  rejecting	  the	  stricter	  criteria	  comes	  at	  a	  significant	  cost.	  If	  we	  adopt	  Goldman’s	  generic	  definition	  of	  simulation	  for	  high-­‐level	  and	  low-­‐level	  simulation,	  then	  simulation	  just	  is	  process	  resemblance.	  However,	  process	  resemblance	  does	  not	  discriminate	  simulational	  processes	  from	  non-­‐simulational	  processes.	  Predicting	  that	  you	  will	  go	  to	  the	  party	  or	  that	  the	  pitcher	  will	  throw	  to	  first	  base	  both	  involve	  process	  resemblance,	  but	  these	  are	  cases	  of	  theorizing,	  not	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simulating.	  Adopting	  the	  generic	  conception	  for	  high-­‐level	  and	  low-­‐level	  simulation	  would	  obscure	  the	  distinction	  between	  simulation	  and	  theory.	  Alternatively,	  if	  one	  adopts	  the	  stricter	  criteria	  for	  high-­‐level	  simulation	  but	  the	  generic	  definition	  for	  low-­‐level	  simulation,	  then	  low-­‐level	  and	  high-­‐level	  simulation	  would	  end	  up	  looking	  quite	  different.	  High-­‐level	  simulation	  would	  involve	  concrete	  resemblance,	  offline	  processing,	  and	  representational	  surrogates,	  whereas	  low-­‐level	  simulation	  would	  involve	  none	  of	  these	  features.	  Low-­‐level	  simulation	  simply	  would	  be	  process	  resemblance.	  The	  criteria	  for	  low-­‐level	  simulation	  would	  be	  significantly	  weaker	  and	  different	  than	  the	  criteria	  for	  high-­‐level	  simulation.	  Adopting	  different	  criteria	  for	  low-­‐level	  and	  high-­‐level	  simulation	  threatens	  the	  idea	  that	  there	  is	  a	  unified	  conception	  of	  simulation.	  “Low-­‐level	  simulation”	  would	  be	  a	  different	  sort	  of	  thing	  altogether,	  and	  evidence	  of	  “low-­‐level	  simulation”	  would	  not	  be	  evidence	  for	  the	  ST	  in	  general.	  Fragmenting	  simulation	  in	  this	  way	  would	  seriously	  damage	  the	  ST.	  Thus,	  there	  are	  several	  good	  reasons	  to	  adopt	  the	  stricter	  criteria	  for	  high-­‐level	  and	  low-­‐level	  simulation.	  By	  far	  the	  most	  discussed	  example	  of	  low-­‐level	  simulational	  mindreading	  is	  mirror	  neurons.	  Mirror	  neurons	  are	  neurons	  that	  fire,	  or	  activate,	  when	  a	  subject	  acts,	  emotes	  or	  experiences	  a	  certain	  sensation,	  and	  also	  when	  a	  subject	  observes	  a	  target	  acting,	  emoting	  or	  experiencing	  a	  certain	  sensation.	  For	  example,	  a	  host	  of	  neurons	  in	  the	  premotor	  cortex	  and	  posterior	  parietal	  cortex	  fires	  when	  I	  grasp	  an	  object,	  and	  this	  same	  host	  of	  neurons	  fires	  when	  I	  observe	  another	  person	  grasping	  an	  object	  (Rizzolatti	  &	  Craighero,	  2004).	  There	  are	  similar	  mirror	  neuron	  systems	  for	  experiencing	  and	  observing	  certain	  emotions.	  When	  I	  experience	  disgust	  and	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when	  I	  observe	  another	  person	  experiencing	  disgust	  the	  same	  collection	  of	  neurons	  in	  the	  insula	  fires	  (Calder,	  Keane,	  Manes,	  Antoun,	  &	  Young,	  2000;	  Wicker	  et	  al.,	  2003).	  Similar	  findings	  hold	  for	  the	  experience	  and	  observation	  of	  fear	  (Adolphs,	  Tranel,	  Damasio,	  &	  Damasio,	  1994),	  anger	  (Lawrence,	  Calder,	  McGowan,	  &	  Grasby,	  2002),	  pain	  (Singer	  et	  al.,	  2004)	  and	  touch	  (Keysers	  &	  Perrett,	  2004).	  In	  each	  of	  these	  cases,	  groups	  of	  neurons	  are	  endogenously	  activated	  when	  the	  subject	  acts,	  emotes,	  or	  feels	  a	  certain	  way,	  and	  these	  same	  groups	  of	  neurons	  are	  exogenously	  activated	  (at	  an	  attenuated	  level)	  when	  the	  subject	  observes	  another	  acting,	  emoting,	  or	  feeling	  in	  those	  same	  ways.	  Some	  theorists	  propose	  that	  mirror	  neurons	  are	  the	  basis	  for	  our	  ability	  to	  understand	  and	  interact	  successfully	  with	  other	  people	  (Gallese,	  2007;	  Gallese,	  Keysers,	  &	  Rizzolatti,	  2004;	  Hurley,	  2005;	  Keysers	  &	  Gazzola,	  2009;	  Oberman	  &	  Ramachandran,	  2009).	  The	  argument	  goes	  like	  this.	  How	  is	  it	  that	  we	  understand	  what	  other	  people	  are	  doing,	  why	  they	  are	  doing	  it,	  what	  they	  are	  going	  to	  do	  next?	  Mirror	  neuron	  studies	  demonstrate	  that	  parts	  of	  our	  brains	  fire	  in	  the	  same	  ways	  when	  we	  observe	  an	  action,	  emotion,	  or	  sensation	  and	  when	  we	  act,	  emote,	  or	  sense	  in	  the	  same	  way.	  The	  suggestion	  is	  that	  we	  understand	  what	  another	  person	  is	  doing,	  feeling,	  and	  experiencing	  because	  when	  we	  observe	  the	  other	  person	  parts	  of	  our	  brains	  are	  activating	  as	  if	  we	  were	  doing	  what	  the	  other	  person	  is	  doing.	  Our	  brain	  activity	  mirrors	  –	  that	  is,	  simulates	  –	  the	  other	  person’s	  brain	  activity	  such	  that	  it	  is	  as	  if	  we	  are	  acting,	  feeling,	  or	  experiencing	  how	  the	  target	  is	  acting,	  feeling,	  or	  experiencing.	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Controversy	  surrounds	  many	  aspects	  of	  mirror	  neurons	  (Hickok,	  2009).	  In	  fact,	  it	  is	  not	  even	  clear	  whether	  the	  empirical	  facts	  support	  the	  claim	  that	  mirror	  neurons	  are	  simulational	  in	  the	  relevant	  respect	  (Herschbach,	  2012;	  Spaulding,	  2012,	  2013).	  In	  this	  context,	  however,	  we	  need	  not	  concern	  ourselves	  so	  much	  with	  these	  controversies.	  Mirror	  neurons	  are	  a	  common	  example	  of	  how	  low-­‐level	  simulation	  works.	  Mirror	  neurons	  are	  supposed	  to	  be	  an	  example	  of	  a	  neural	  mechanism	  that	  has	  the	  function	  of	  concretely	  replicating	  a	  target’s	  experience.	  We	  do	  not	  need	  to	  worry	  about	  whether	  this	  particular	  neural	  mechanism	  actually	  meets	  all	  the	  criteria	  in	  order	  to	  use	  it	  as	  an	  illustrative	  example.	  	  Low-­‐level	  simulation	  faces	  a	  version	  of	  the	  threat	  of	  collapse	  (Spaulding,	  2012,	  2015).	  The	  threat	  of	  collapse	  for	  high-­‐level	  simulation	  is	  that	  indefinitely	  many	  propositional	  attitude	  combinations	  are	  compatible	  with	  the	  observed	  behavior,	  and	  simulation	  itself	  provides	  no	  way	  to	  determine	  when	  we	  have	  landed	  on	  a	  plausible,	  good-­‐enough	  explanation	  of	  the	  observed	  behavior.	  The	  threat	  of	  collapse	  for	  high-­‐level	  simulation	  concerns	  propositional	  attitudes.	  Low-­‐level	  simulation	  involves	  non-­‐propositional	  attitudes,	  such	  as	  basic	  intentions	  and	  emotions.	  I	  will	  use	  mirror	  neurons	  to	  illustrate	  the	  threat	  of	  collapse	  for	  low-­‐level	  simulation.	  Again,	  though	  there	  are	  genuine	  concerns	  about	  whether	  the	  empirical	  data	  supports	  the	  claim	  that	  mirror	  neurons	  are	  simulational	  in	  the	  relevant	  respect,	  let	  us	  set	  aside	  those	  concerns	  for	  now.	  The	  threat	  of	  collapse	  for	  low-­‐level	  simulation	  is	  that	  an	  observed	  behavior	  or	  facial	  expression	  is	  compatible	  with	  a	  number	  of	  different	  basic	  intentions	  or	  emotions.	  A	  blush	  may	  indicate	  embarrassment,	  happiness,	  anger,	  or	  even	  just	  a	  hot	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flash.	  The	  same	  applies	  even	  more	  clearly	  for	  basic	  intentions.	  A	  given	  behavioral	  movement	  may	  indicate	  an	  intention	  to	  eat,	  give,	  tease,	  throw,	  play	  with,	  put	  away,	  etc.	  We	  need	  more	  information	  than	  the	  simulation	  heuristic	  provides	  in	  order	  to	  be	  justified	  in	  attributing	  to	  a	  target	  a	  particular	  intention	  or	  emotion.	  The	  observed	  behavior	  is	  compatible	  with	  a	  number	  of	  mental	  states,	  and	  the	  low-­‐level	  simulation	  itself	  provides	  no	  way	  to	  determine	  the	  plausibility	  of	  the	  candidate	  emotions	  or	  intentions.	  That	  is,	  there	  is	  no	  sufficing	  heuristic	  or	  stopping	  point	  built	  into	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  low-­‐level	  simulation.	  We	  need	  other	  information	  to	  discriminate	  among	  the	  intentions	  that	  could	  cause	  the	  behavior,	  or	  the	  emotions	  that	  could	  cause	  the	  blush.	  This	  may	  be	  information	  about	  the	  target’s	  recent	  history,	  her	  personality,	  how	  certain	  situations	  make	  her	  feel,	  folk	  psychological	  platitudes	  about	  how	  behaviors	  relate	  to	  mental	  states,	  etc.	  	  One	  way	  to	  mediate	  the	  threat	  of	  collapse	  for	  high-­‐level	  simulation	  is	  to	  endorse	  of	  a	  hybrid	  ST/TT	  model.	  The	  TT	  provides	  the	  theoretical	  information	  required	  to	  move	  from	  identifying	  possible	  mental	  states	  to	  knowing	  a	  target’s	  mental	  states.	  There	  is	  an	  analogous	  move	  for	  low-­‐level	  simulation.	  One	  could	  hold	  that	  low-­‐level	  simulational	  mechanisms	  receive	  input	  from	  and	  send	  output	  to	  non-­‐simulational	  mechanisms.	  In	  fact,	  functional	  anatomical	  evidence	  supports	  the	  idea	  that	  simulational	  and	  non-­‐simulational	  mechanisms	  are	  integrated	  in	  this	  way.	  	  During	  action	  observation,	  mirror	  neurons	  receive	  input	  from	  the	  superior	  temporal	  sulcus	  (STS),	  an	  area	  independently	  associated	  with	  perception	  of	  social	  stimuli,	  mentalizing,	  and	  action	  understanding	  (Rizzolatti	  &	  Craighero,	  2004,	  p.	  172).	  Mirror	  neuron	  regions	  send	  output	  to	  the	  primary	  and	  secondary	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somatosensory	  cortices	  and	  the	  middle	  temporal	  lobe	  (Rizzolatti	  &	  Sinigaglia,	  2010,	  p.	  265).	  The	  STS,	  mirror	  neuron	  areas,	  and	  somatosensory	  cortices	  are	  informationally	  integrated.	  These	  neural	  regions,	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  aFMC,	  posterior	  STS,	  and	  temporal	  parietal	  junction	  (TPJ),	  are	  involved	  perception	  of	  social	  stimuli,	  action	  understanding,	  and	  mentalizing	  (Brass,	  Schmitt,	  Spengler,	  &	  Gergely,	  2007).	  	  These	  data	  show	  that	  there	  are	  several	  neural	  regions	  informationally	  integrated	  with	  mirror	  neurons	  that	  are	  involved	  with	  the	  same	  functions	  that	  mirror	  neurons	  are	  alleged	  to	  be	  involved	  in.	  Importantly,	  these	  other	  regions	  do	  not	  operate	  by	  neural	  reuse.	  Thus,	  one	  empirically	  and	  theoretically	  plausible	  way	  to	  address	  the	  threat	  of	  collapse	  for	  low-­‐level	  simulation	  is	  to	  conceive	  of	  the	  low-­‐level	  simulational	  mechanism	  as	  informationally	  integrated	  with	  other	  non-­‐simulational	  mechanisms.	  These	  non-­‐simulational	  mechanisms	  supplement	  the	  simulational	  mechanism	  in	  the	  same	  way	  that	  theoretical	  knowledge	  supplements	  high-­‐level	  simulation.	  
	  
5.	  Conclusion	  	  There	  has	  been	  much	  philosophical	  and	  empirical	  work	  on	  the	  ST	  in	  the	  last	  decade	  or	  so,	  and	  as	  a	  result	  it	  is	  a	  flourishing	  theory.	  My	  discussion	  in	  this	  chapter	  attempts	  to	  clarify	  some	  aspects	  of	  the	  ST,	  specifically,	  the	  concept	  of	  simulation,	  high-­‐level	  simulation,	  and	  low-­‐level	  simulation.	  I	  argued	  that	  we	  have	  good	  reasons	  to	  adopt	  a	  more	  precise	  conception	  simulation	  for	  high-­‐level	  and	  low-­‐level	  simulation.	  The	  stricter	  criteria	  rule	  out	  some	  illegitimate	  examples	  of	  simulation,	  and	  they	  also	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capture	  what	  is	  truly	  distinctive	  about	  legitimate	  cases	  of	  simulation.	  I	  hope	  this	  more	  precise	  conception	  of	  simulation	  will	  contribute	  to	  the	  flourishing	  of	  the	  ST.	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